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Article 5

B lA c k G l R e s is t a n c e D u r in q
W ar

t Me

V ie t n a m

DAvid CoRTRiqhT

One of the least known but most important chapters in the
history of Am erica’s encounter with Vietnam was the internal rebellion
that wracked the U.S. military. From the Long Binh ja il in Vietnam, to
Travis Air Force Base in California, to aircraft carriers in the South China
Sea, the armed forces faced widespread resistance and unrest.
Throughout the military morale and discipline sank to record lows.
Antiwar committee and underground newspapers appeared everywhere.1
Unauthorized absence rates reached unprecedented levels: in the Arm y
in 1971 there were seventeen AW OLs and seven desertions for every one
hundred soldiers.2 Harsher forms of rebellion also occurred— drug
abuse, violent uprisings, refusal of orders, even attacks against superiors.
The cumulative result of this resistance within the ranks was a severe
breakdown in military effectiveness and combat capability. By 1969 the
Arm y had ceased to function as an effective fighting force and was rapidly
disintegrating. The armed forces had to be withdrawn from Indochina
for their very survival.
The strongest and most militant resisters were black GIs. O f all
the soldiers o f the Vietnam era, black and other minority GIs were
consistently the most active in their opposition to the war and military
injustice. Blacks faced greater oppression that whites, and they fought
back with greater detennination and anger. The rebellions that shook
American cities like Watts, Newark, and Detroit erupted at major
military installationsjust a few years later. The result was a military tom
by racial rebellion.
The militancy of black GIs was a reaction to the pervasiveness of
racial discrimination within the military. Racism has always existed in
the Am erican military as it has in the larger civilian society. In some
respects the milit ary is better than civilian life: in 1948, the anned forces
were desegregated before m any civilian agencies, and military sendee is
one of the few avenues o f potential advancement available for blacks. In
other respects, though, the military is worse: the arbitrary nature of
command authority can mean a miserable existence for those who seme
under prejudiced commanders. Studies conducted during the Vietnam
era confinn that institutionalized discrimination was widespread,
especially in the military justice system. One of the most thorough
studies was the Department of defense’s own four-volume Report o f the
Task Force on the Administration o f Military Justice, issued in December
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1972. According to the Pentagon report, “No command or installation...
is entirely free from the effects of systematic discrimination against
minority servicemen.”3 The Congressional Black Caucus also conducted
a study of discrimination within the military in 1972 and came up with
similar findings. The Caucus’ report concluded that “racism has
become institutionalized at all levels of the m ilitary.”4
Job assignment is a primary concern for black GIs, and the
Pentagon and Black Caucus reports confirmed what the soldiers already
knew: they were disproportionately assigned to low-skill and dead-end
positions, especially in combat and service jobs. In 1971, according to
the Black Caucus study, black servicemen represented 12.1 percent of
all enlisted people, but they constituted 16.3 percent of those in combat,
and 19.6 percent of those in service and supply positions.5 By contrast
they held only 4.9 percent of jobs in electronics specialties. In an Army
study of dissenters in 1971, 31% of blacks interviewed were assigned to
combat, compared to only 18% of the whites.6 Blacks were also
discrim inated against in m ilitary promotions.
Blacks were
disproportionately assigned to the low est ranks and were
underrepresented at the highest grades.
This pattern was most
pronounced in the Officer Corps. In 1974, blacks constituted 16 percent
of all military personnel, but only 2.8 percent of officers.7
The system of military justice is notoriously discriminatory. The
Department of Defense Task Force found that “a greater number of black
enlisted men received non-judicial punishment [25 percent] than their
proportionate number [12 percent].”8 Likewise in General and Special
courts-martial studied by the Task Force, 23.4 percent of blacks and
only 16.9 percent of whites received a punitive discharge as part of their
sentence.9 The incidence of less-than-honorable discharges shows the
same pattern. In 1971 less-than-honorable discharges were issued to
one of every seven black GIs, compared to only one of every fourteen
whites.10 Blacks were twice as likely as whites to receive a bad discharge.
While the struggle against racism and injustice was a major
concern for black GIs, they, like most other soldiers, were also motivated
by opposition to the war. The Army study of dissenters noted above
confirms that ending the war was the number one priority for the
majority of GI resisters. When asked to give the reason for their
participation in dissent activities, the soldiers interviewed cited the
"Vietnam War" 58 percent of the time. The other major reason, “The Way
the Army Treats the Individual,” was cited 38 percent of the tim e.11 For
black and other minority GIs, opposition to the war had a special
meaning. Many blacks asked why they should risk death to defend
freedom in Vietnam when they were denied basic rights back home. Why
should they fight Asians in a distant land when they could be struggling
against discrimination and racism in their own society? Such critical
thinking received encouragement from the example of Cassius Clay
[Muhammed Ali] and other draft resisters, and the antiwar speeches of
Martin Luther King. Jr. A popular documentary movie of the time was
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titled No Vietnamese Ever Called Me Nigger. The teachings of Malcolm
X and his radical critique of the war also had influence at several m ajor
bases. Andrew Pulley, a leader of GIs United Against the War at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, reports that he and other soldiers were
initiated into the GI movement by listening to tapes of Malcolm X in the
barracks.12
For black GIs, opposition to military authority was often expressed
in cultural symbols. Throughout the military blacks gathered in
informal study groups and cultural clubs to listen to music, to study and
rap together, and to promote black pride and consciousness. Many of
these groups became centers o f resistance activity as the connections
between the war and racism spurred growing numbers of GIs into action.
Often they would join together in collective defiance of the military. I
remember from my own experience at Fort Bliss, Texas, for example, that
“the brothers” roomed together in the same part of the barracks and
engaged in behavior that blatantly challenged regulations. Many of the
troops had huge Afro haircuts that far exceeded allowable standards. A
group of ten or more of the brothers adorned with beads or African
jew elry would strut conspicuously across the quad between the barracks
carrying “power sticks” (African walking sticks with a carved fist at the
top). Their Army caps perched atop oversized Afros, m any wearing
sneakers rather than combat boots, most with their shirts unbloused
and unbuttoned, they were an affront to the military dress code. But the
brothers were left alone. The company sergeants and commanders
already had more than enough trouble dealing with the current level of
dissent , and they did not want to cause more trouble by challenging the
blacks.
One controversial cultural expression of the time was the “dap”
or “power greeting”— an elaborate series o f hand slapping and finger
popping that could sometimes take a minute or more to perform .13 An
innocuous enough greeting by itself, it sometimes became the center of
conflict when prejudiced commanders or NCOs took offense and issued
instructions banning it. In response, some blacks would develop an even
more elaborate and time-consuming form o f the dap, which they
invariably chose to perform in m ess hall lines, where it would cause the
greatest disruption. Such manifestations of solidarity occurred frequently
throughout the military and were an important assertion of social
identity for black GIs.
To bet ter appreciate the extent of the GI resistance movement, let
us consult again the Army study of dissent. Conducted in 1970 and
1971 by the Research Analysis Corporation, a Virginia-based think tank
that frequently served Arm y needs, the two volume report depicts a GI
movement even more widespread than those of us involved at the time
thought possible. The Arm y’s researchers interviewed hundreds of
soldiers at major Arm y bases in the continental United States to
determine the extent of participation in resistance activities and GI
attitudes toward the military. The survey found that one out of every four
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enlisted soldiers had participated in “dissident” activities, defined as
attendance at a coffee house, publication of a GI newspaper, participation
in a demonstration, etc. The study found that an equal percentage of
soldiers engaged in acts of “disobedience,” which was defined as
insubordination, refusing orders, sabotaging equipment, etc. This
dist inction between dissent and disobedience is helpful for understanding
the full range of GI resistance activities. By combining these two
categories of opposition, the Research Analysis Corporation found that
a startling 47 percent of the soldiers interviewed engaged in some form
of dissent or disobedience, with 32 percent involved in such activities
more than once. If frequent drug use is added as another form of
resistance, the combined percentage of soldiers involved in rebellious
behavior comes to an incredible 55 percent. The Arm y’s own study thus
shows that half of its soldiers during the 1970-1971 period were engaged
in resistance activity— a truly astounding level of disaffection within the
ranks.14
The development of the GI movement followed the evolution of
the war itself. Soldier resistance appeared first in the Arm y and Marine
Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting in the early years of the war.
As the Army and Marine Corps were withdrawn and the burden of
continuing the war fell to the Navy and Air Force, the GI movement took
hold in these services, and by 1970 the locus of revolt had shifted more
to the Navy and Air Force.
During the first phase of the GI movement, black Marines and
soldiers staged numerous rebellions at stateside bases. These were
usually prison uprisings sparked by mistreatment and oppressive
conditions. At Fort Bragg, on July 23, 1968, black and white GIs seized
control of the stockade to protest the beating of a black inmate. The
rebels held the stockade for forty-eight hours before surrendering to
armed troops from the 82nd Airborne.15 Similar rebellions occurred at
several Army bases in 1969— on May 13 at Fort Carson, on June 5 at Fort
Dix, and on three separate occasions at Fort Riley. Nonviolent protests
and boycotts were also led by blacks that year at Fort Ord and Fort
Jackson.
Major rebellions also occurred in the Marine Corps. The oppressive
brig at Camp Pendleton, California— described in an influential article as
“Andersonville by the Sea”— was the site of several violent incidents.16
After a series of protests during 1969, the prison exploded in bitterness
and frustration. On the night of September 14, hundreds o f prisoners
broke out of their barracks, setting fires and smashing nearly everything
in sight. When the rebellion was finally suppressed by tear gas-firing
Military Police (MPs), the entire prison was a sham bles.17 An even more
severe and tragic uprising occurred on July 20, 1969, at Camp Lejeune.
A dispute over a racial incident at an enlisted m en’s club turned into a
huge brawl that spread over the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines barracks
area. The fighting left fourteen injured and one Marine dead.18
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GI resistance was even more widespread among the more than
200,000 Am erican soldiers stationed in W est Germany. Black GIs
organized study groups and rap clubs at nearly every m ajor U.S. base in
Germany. Am ong the more active groups were Unsatisfied Black
Soldiers from the Mannheim-Heidelberg area, the Black Action Group in
the Stuttgart region, and the Black Dissent Group from Smiley barracks
at Karlsruhe. In 1970 these groups joined together at a remarkable “Call
for Justice” assembly at the University of Heidelberg. Nearly 1,000 active
duty soldiers, most of them black, gathered on July 4 to issue their own
declaration of independence, demanding an end to the war, a withdrawal
of U.S. interests from southern Africa, the elimination o f discriminatory
practices in military justice and a guarantee to equal opportunity for
black and other minority GIs.19
While black and white GI groups often worked in isolation from
one another, black-white unity sometimes emerged with potent effect.
An example occurred at Nellingen, West Germany, in the summer and
fall of 1970. The arrival of a zealous new commander and an increase
in complaints about harassment and racial discrimination created a
virtual war within the base. A Molotov cocktail was exploded outside the
company orderly room, several fire bombings occurred on the base, and
there were increasing incidents of sabotage. As the harassment of the
troops and the number of racial incidents increased, the soldiers
threatened to blow up the base. On the evening of September 21,
approximately one hundred black and white GIs broke a curfew and
marched through the base shouting “Revolution!” and “Join us!” to fellow
GIs. The men returned to their barracks, but only after the Provost
Marshal pledged that no reprisals would be carried out. Similar acts of
defiance occurred at numerous bases, notjust in Germany but throughout
the military.20
The cumulative result of this mounting wave of resistance was a
severe crisis for U.S. ground forces. Already reeling from the heavy
combat losses and huge manpower commitments of the Vietnam war,
the Army faced a “terrible nightmare,” in the words of author Shelby
Stanton.21 Practically every unit in the Arm y had been stripped of
manpower for Vietnam and faced severe internal turmoil. Stanton
writes:
By that year [1968] in Europe only 39 percent of the 465
reporting units had a personnel readiness equal to their
deliberately diminished assigned capability.... Even more chilling
was the secret December 31,1968 pronouncement by the United
State Army in Europe that none of its major units had met their
operational training readiness conditions for the second straight
year.22

Within the United States the situation was even worse:
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In June of 1968 the Joint Chiefs o f Staff were forced to flunk every
division and brigade on the continent with the lowest grading
possible in all categories— including personnel training and
logistics, with the exception o f the 82nd Airborne Division which
had a brigade in Vietnam.23

Within Vietnam the morale and disciplinary crisis was the most
severe of all and sapped the Arm y’s ability to fight. The most extreme and
tragic manifestation of the collapse of the Arm y was fragging, an attack
against a sergeant or commander with a fragmentation grenade. According
to the Arm y’s own statistics there were 551 fragging incidents in the
years 1969-1972, resulting in 86 deaths and over 700 injuries. Eighty
percent of the victims in these incidents were officers and NCOs.24 These
statistics do not tell the full story o f the internal rebellion within the
Army, since they do not include shootings with fiream is, which were also
common. By 1969 the Anny was at war with itself. Gung-ho officers
eager to push their men into battle were an endangered species and often
became the victims of assault by their own men. Shelby Stanton
confirms what had been a widely circulated rumor at the time: following
the bloody ten day battle for Hamburger Hill in May 1969, soldiers put
a notice in an underground newspaper offering a $10,000 reward for
fragging the officers in charge.25
The ultimate impact of the spreading internal breakdown was
that soldiers increasingly refused to fight. By 1969 combat refusals and
mutinies occurred with shocking frequency. One example during 1969
involved A Company of the First Battalion/506th Regiment at Camp
Evans near the A Shau Valley. After a night of racial tensions that almost
resulted in a shoot-out between black and white soldiers, fifteen black
soldiers refused to report for combat patrol the next day.26 Numerous
such incidents occurred throughout Vietnam. During research for
Soldier’s Revolt, we were able to identify ten major incidents of combat
refusal. Stanton’s study, drawing upon official Arm y unit archives,
shows that the “ugly stain o f combat disobedience” had reached epidemic
proportions. In the elite First Cavalry Division alone, according to
Stanton, there were thirty-five incidents of refusal to fight during 1970,
some involving entire units.27
One of the most severe rebellions of the Vietnam era occurred in
1968 among black inmates at the Long Binh jail, known to the troops as
LBJ. As was common throughout the military at the time, LEkJ was
oppressive and overcrowded, and many of the prisoners were black.
Tensions and violence within the jail steadily rose until it exploded at the
end ofAugust in a rebellion that left much of the stockade destroyed and
resulted in injuries to 63 soldiers, including 23 who required
hospitalization. One GI, Pvt. Edward Haskett of St. Petersburg, Florida,
was killed in the uprising. Afterwards, nearly 200 blacks banded
together and staged a work strike. A small group barricaded themselves
within the stockade and continued to hold out for more than a month.28
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A similar rebellion occurred two weeks earlier at the Marine brig
in Da Nang. The prisoners seized control o f the central compound area
and held out against armed guards for twenty hours. When commanders
tried to remove some of the inmates a few days later, violence erupted
again and a force of 120 riot-equipped MPs was required to restore order.
Eight soldiers were injured in the incident, and the cell block was heavily
damaged by fire.29
As elsewhere in the military, blacks in Vietnam formed solidarity
grou ps and rap clubs that often became the centers of political resistance.
One such group, the so-called “Black Liberation Front of the Armed
Forces,” was lead by Eddie Burney, a Black Panther Party supporter
stationed at the 4th Transportation Command in Long Binh. In the
spring o f 1971, Burney and other blacks staged a demonstration at Long
Minh to commemorate the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Chanting
“Free Angela Davis!” and “Free the Brothers in LBJ!” forty GIs participated
in the action.30 Similar groups appeared at other camps in Vietnam, as
black GIs banded together to oppose the w ar and defend themselves
against harassment and discrimination. Their resistance activities had
an enormous impact on the Am erican m ilitary and played a crucial role
in speeding the end o f the war.
As noted earlier, the GI movement spread from the Arm y and
Marine Corps to the Air Force and Navy as the latter services assumed
the principal burden of continuing the Am erican war effort. The
rebellion that nearly crippled the Arm y and Marine Corps began to
disrupt operations in the Air Force and Navy as well. By 1972, resistance
had reached the point where B-52 crews were refusing to fly and the
Navy’s aircraft carriers were crippled by sabotage and internal rebellion.
As in the Army and Marine Corps, black servicemen played a
leading role in the GI movement within the Air Force. Faced wilh the
usual injustices— unequal job assignment, a disproportionate number
of disciplinary punishments, slow promotions—black airmen joined
together to defend their interests. As elsewhere in the military, they
formed discussion groups or cultural organizations. At the end of 1970,
A ir Force Times admitted the existence of twenty-five such groups, many
of them actively engaged in local struggles against injustice.31 One such
group, affiliated with the Am erican Servicemen’s Union, was the Black
Discussion Group, active during 1971 at Plattsburgh Air Force Base in
New York. Another was Concerned Black Airmen, centered at Chanute
A ir Force Base in Illinois. In 1971, the Chanute group held an on-base
service on Armed Forces Day, May 17, dedicated to the memory ol
Malcolm X. In August, after months of worsening racial tensions on the
base and growing black frustration, Chanute erupted into violence.
During a three-day period, the base exchange, theater, and gas station
were damaged and several airmen were injured. A few weeks later eighty
men participated in a demonstration and picket line outside a high level
meeting of the Air Training Command, to press home their demands for
equal treatment.32
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There were other uprisings and militant actions at air bases
during the war, but the largest and most dramatic occurred at Travis Air
Force Base in May, 1971. Travis was a crucial center for the Am erican
war effort, and the primary embarkation point for flights to Indochina.
From May 22 through May 25, this important California base was
crippled by perhaps the largest mass rebellion in the history of the Air
Force. The roots of the conflict lay in command repression, rampant
discrimination against black airmen, and a general crisis in morale
resulting from the increasing unpopularity of the war. The rebellion
began with a fracas at the local enlisted m en’s club, and quickly
broadened into a generalized uprising throughout the base. Fighting
apparently began on Saturday afternoon between black enlistees and
the base security police. Following the incident, the minority barracks
area was cordoned off and a number of black airmen were arrested.
Anger and resentment continued to mount and on Monday evening the
base erupted in violence as more than two hundred enlisted people,
some whites included, attempted to free the imprisoned blacks and were
met by a force of three hundred MPs and nearly eighty civilian officers
called in from surrounding communities. A major brawl ensued that
involved some six hundred airmen. The officers’ club was burned,
several dozen people were injured, and 135 GIs (most of them black) were
arrested. Fighting continued into the next day; armed guards patrolled
the base and all incoming traffic was searched at the gate.33 For a few
days, Travis was in a virtual state of siege, with base activities disrupted
and nearly all attention devoted to restoring order.
In the wake of the 1971 Travis revolt, the Pentagon hurriedly
dispatched special race relations advisors to the base in an attempt to
prevent further violence. Throughout the Air Force (and in other services
as well), racial harmony programs were established, including “human
relations” councils and so-called equal opportunity officers, as a means
of stemming the growing black rebellion. The new policies had little
impact on the actual conditions of service and were designed mainly to
channel grievances into controllable outlets. These programs did
nothing to alter the systemic discrimination and injustice within the
military, and they did not even address the problem of the continuing
war in Indochina.
The GI movement in the Air Force continued to grow right up
until the end of direct U.S. involvement in the war in 1973. By 1972,
there were more than thirty active GI organizing projects and underground
newspapers within the Air Force, not counting the substantial number
of black discussion groups. With each new wave o f bombing by the Nixon
administration, protests and demonstrations erupted at bases throughout
the world. During the massive escalation of bombing in response to the
1972 Easter offensive, demonstrations and rallies occurred at dozens of
air bases throughout the world— including Westover, Mountain Home,
Kirtland, McGuire, Offutt, Travis and March Air Force Bases in the
United States, andYokota, Misawa, and C larkA irF orce Bases in Asia.34
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The rising tide of antiwar resistance ultimately began to disrupt
bombing operations and reached even the predominantly white officer
pilots. Morale among airmen and crew members at the combat bases in
Thailand and Guam steadily plummeted in 1972, as evidenced by rising
heroin use and increasing incidents of “fodding” or “foreign object
damage”— a phrase used to describe the unknown source o f damage to
aircraft. In December, two pilots stationed in Thailand (Captains Dwight
D. Evans and Michael Heck) refused to fly further combat missions.35 In
the spring of 1973, four B-52 crewmen stationed at Guam joined in a
federal court suit filed in New York by Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtzman, challenging the constitutionality of the continued bombing.36
Shortly thereafter the Pentagon cut back on bombing missions, and a
few months later Congress finally cut off funding and brought to an end
the most intensive bombing campaign in the history of warfare.
Black resistance in the Navy also increased dramatically as its
giant aircraft carrier task groups assumed increased responsibility for
carrying on the air war. The Navy had traditionally been the most racist
of the military services. It was the last to desegregate, and it has had a
long tradition of exploiting Filipinos as servants and cooks. In 1971,
fewer than five percent of the Navy’s sailors were black, and the
percentage of blacks among officers was less than one percent. The
expanding manpower needs of the Vietnam war, though, forced the Navy
to open its doors to an increasing number of black recruits. While the
number of blacks grew, the discriminatory traditions of the past remained.
The result was widespread resistance and political dissent, with black
sailors playing a leading role in the GI movement within the Navy.
By 1970 underground newspapers and protest actions began to
appear at m ajor naval bases and even aboard ships. One of the earliest
manifestations of this development was the Movement for a Democratic
Military (MDM), a network of loosely connected radical groups that
appeared at San Diego, Long Beach, and Alameda in California, and at
the Navy’s Great Lakes Naval Training Center near Chicago. The Great
Lakes MDM chapter included a considerable number of black sailors,
and in July, 1970, blacks and whites staged a series of protest marches
and demonstrations in an attempt to free four WAVES they felt were
unjustly imprisoned in the base brig.37
As the pace of Naval air operations off the Indochina coast
intensified in 1971 and 1972, the level of antiwar opposition also grew.
As aircraft carriers left their California ports for combat missions in the
South China Sea, they were greeted not by the traditional cheering
crowds, but with protest demonstrations and political opposition. In
October, 1971, sailors and antiwar civilians in San Diego organized an
informal election to decide whether the U.S.S. Constitution should sail for
Vietnam. Fifty-four thousand San Diegans voted in an unofficial
referendum, including 6,900 active duty servicemen and women. Eightytwo percent of the civilians and 73 percent of the servicepeople voted to
keep the Connie home.38 The ship eventually departed for Indochina, but
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it sailed under a cloud of dissent. A similar movement, initiated entirely
by active duty sailors, emerged at the same time aboard the carrier U.S.S.
Coral Sea at Alameda. Twelve hundred sailors— one fourth of the entire
crew— signed a petition opposing the war in Indochina and urging that
the ship stay home.39 A similar below decks movement emerged in
opposition to the sailing o f the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk a few months later.
When each of these ships sailed, a small group of black and white sailors
on board declared that they could not in conscience participate in the
war and publicly refused to go.
The Nixon administration’s response to the Easter offensive in
1972 placed even greater pressures on an already heavily committed
Navy. During the rest o f that year as many as four carrier task groups
(out of a total of fourteen) were on combat station in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Normal fleet operations were completely disrupted, as practically the
entire Pacific fleet was thrown into the fray. For the already overworked
crew members involved, the escalation created great hardships. With
opposition to the war spreading rapidly, morale plummeted. While many
sailors expressed their opposition through acts of political dissent, many
others resorted to more extreme measures of disobedience and
obstruction.
Perhaps the most shocking manifestation of the disintegration of
morale within the Navy in 1972 was the growing prevalence of internal
sabotage. In its 1973 report on Navy disciplinary problems, the House
Armed Sendees Committee disclosed what it termed “an alarming
frequency of successful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a
wide variety of ships and stations.” 40 The Committee reported “literally
hundreds of instances of damage to Naval property wherein sabotage is
suspected.”41 The most dramatic and important o f these internal acts of
disruption occurred in July, 1972, when within the space of ju st three
weeks, two of the Navy’s aircraft carriers were put out of commission by
attacks from within. On July 10, 1972, a massive fire broke out aboard
the U.S.S. Forrestalin Norfolk. The blaze caused seven million dollars in
damage and was described as the largest single act of sabotage in Naval
history. The carrier’s deployment was delayed by more than two
months.42 Three weeks later another act of sabotage crippled the carrier
U.S.S. Ranger as it was about to depart from Alameda for Indochina. A
paint scraper and two twelve-inch bolts were inserted into the ship’s
reduction gears, causing nearly one million dollars in damage and
forcing a three-and-a-half month delay in operations for extensive
repairs.43
The sabotaging of the Ranger and Forrestal set the stage for one
of the most violent internal uprisings in the history of the Navy— the
rebellion aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. In October, 1972, after a
grueling eight months at sea and constant bombing missions in the Gulf
of Tonkin, the huge ship pulled into Subic Bay in the Philippines for a
rest stop before a scheduled return home. Unexpectedly, the crew was
informed that rather than sailing home, they had to return to combat
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operations in the South China Sea. According to the report on the
incident by the House Armed Services Committee, “this rescheduling
apparently was due to the incidents of sabotage aboard her sister ships
U.S.S. Ranger and U.S.S. Forrestal.”44 With two of the Navy’s principal
carriers out of commission due to sabotage, the Kilty Hawk was forced
to cancel its return home. With tensions already high among crew
members due to declining morale and rising racial tensions, the order to
return to Vietnam was the spark that touched off violence. On the night
before the ship’s departure, serious fighting erupted at the Subic Bay
enlisted men’s club. On the evening of October 12, as the ship arrived
at Yankee Station off the coast of Indochina, the ship’s intelligence
investigator exacerbated tensions by calling in only black sailors for
questioning about the brawl at Subic. Outraged at what they considered
unfair treatment, over one hundred blacks gathered for a meeting on the
ship’s aft mess deck at approximately 8pm. The armed Marine detachment
aboard the earner was summoned to suppress the meeting, and an
explosive situation quickly developed. The Executive Officer (XO),
Commander Benjamin Cloud (a black man), entered the area and
attempted to restore calm by ordering the blacks and Marines to
separate ends of the ship. Moments later, however, Captain Marland
Townsends, the Commanding Officer (CO), arrived and issued conflicting
orders. As confusion spread, the blacks and armed Marines encountered
each other unexpectedly on the hanger deck and a bitter clash erupted.
The fighting spread rapidly throughout the ship, with bands o f blacks
and whites marauding through the decks and attacking each other with
fists, chains, wrenches, and pipes. For hours the ship seethed with
violent conflict and confusion. At one point the XO believed that the CO
had been injured or killed, and made an announcement over the public
address system ordering the rebels and armed Marines to separate
locations. The Commander, still on the hanger deck and distressed at
the X O ’s announcement, gave different orders over the address system.
Finally, at about 2:30am at a meeting in the forecastle, the black sailors
agreed to lay down their chains and other weapons and disperse. A total
of forty-seven men, most of them black, were treated for injuries that
night. Three had to be evacuated to shore hospitals. All twenty-five
sailors arrested for the incident were black.45
A few weeks later, another major rebellion— this time nonviolent—
occurred aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Constellation in San Diego.
Described by the New York Times as “the first mass mutiny in the history
of the U.S. Navy,”45 the rebellion aboard the Constellation grew out of the
effort s of an onboard organization known as The Black Fraction to resist
repression and discrimination against black crew members. Throughout
Oct ober, 1972, the black sailors organized committ ees among themselves,
elected representatives and demanded investigations into the ship’s
records of non-judicial punishment. A s the organization grew in
strength, the ship’s commanders singled out fifteen members as agitators
and ordered that six o f them be given immediate less-than-honorable
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discharges. Rumors began to circulate that as many as two hundred
blacks would receive bad discharges. In response, more than one
hundred sailors—mostly black, but including a few whites— staged a sitin in the aft mess deck on November 3, 1972. The sailors continued their
protest action throughout the day and into the next morning, refusing
a direct order to report for muster. To avert violence and another Kitty
Hawk incident, the ship’s captain decided to return to North Island in
San Diego and put the dissident group ashore as a “beach detachment.”
More than 130 men, most of them black, went ashore. A few days later,
on November 8th, the commander ordered the men to return to the
Constellation. The sailors refused and instead mustered in their own
formation on the pier, in effect staging a dockside strike. A total of 122
crewmen were involved in the action. Despite their direct refusal of an
order, the rebels received light treatment. Commanders were apparently
eager to prevent, at all costs, further violence or uprisings. A number of
the rebels were quietly discharged, but most were simply reassigned to
shore duty.47
In the wake of the Kitiy Hawk and the Constellation incidents,
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, called together eighty
leading admirals and Marine Corps generals for an emergency meeting
at the Pentagon in order to address the problem of race relations. The
assembled commanders were urged to be more sensitive to the growing
number of blacks within the military and to give greater attention to the
human relations councils and other reforms recently introduced by the
Pentagon.4” In some places commanders sponsored educational programs
on black history and culture, and sensitivity sessions and discussion
groups were allowed. As noted earlier, these attempts at reform did
nothing to redress the structural injustices and systematic discrimination
encountered by blacks within the military. Moreover, as long as the war
in Vietnam continued and American troops remained in Indochina, the
GI movement and the black rebellion within the military continued. Only
in 1973, as the direct U.S. combat role finally came to an end, did
tensions within the ranks begin to ease and military life slowly return to
normal.
As A n erican forces completed their withdrawal from Indochina
and the military shifted to the all-volunteer force, hundreds of thousands
of Vietnam-era GIs were discharged en masse. Manpower levels in the
military dropped sharply from a high of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.3 million
in 1972. In some cases, an “early out” release program allowed enlisted
people to return home months ahead of schedule. Many of the black
resisters in the Navy were released under this program in 1972; the same
strategy was used to rid the Arm y of soldier activists the year before. The
longest and most divisive war in American history was at last over, and
the GIs who resisted it were sent home. Military commanders breathed
a collective sigh of relief and began the arduous task of rebuilding their
shattered services and creating a new all-volunteer force.
Although little known or understood, the GI resistance movement
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in which blacks played a leading role was an important part of the
Vietnam war experience. Never before in m odern history had the
Am erican armed forced faced such widespread internal revolt. Hundreds
of thousands of soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors dissented and
disobeyed military commanders, often at grave personal risk, to speak
out for peace and justice. Their struggle had a m ajor impact in forcing
the Am erican m ilitary to finally end the war in Vietnam.
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